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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Hazard analysis of Hydrogen fuel cell ships using land based
accidents data and elicitation of experts.
Degree: Master of Science
Over the past few years, hydrogen has attracted a lot of attention. Even though industry
interest is growing and a several studies have been launched, there are still numerous
obstacles to overcome. The remaining challenges are primarily related to safety
aspects, and there is, in a nutshell, a demand for greater more gaps in the use of
hydrogen fuel cell in marine applications. The purpose of this study intends to
contribute to the investigation of hazards associated with HFC in the shipping industry.
The study investigates the existence of different hazards, their causes and
consequences from various industry based on hydrogen incident database. In
particular, it investigates the way the lesson learnt from previously available incidents
contributes in creating such a foundation for safety measures in the shipping industry
regarding the new technology of HFC. The study employed an exploratory HAZID
study based on past incidents analysis. In addition to the qualitative exploratory part,
the validity of the findings overcoming from the incidents database were assessed by
elicitation from the experts. The study yielded four factors that can affect and
jeopardise safety when HFC is used: Human error, management factors, equipment
failure and other factors. In addition to four hazardous events which are: Leakage,
source of ignition in the space, permeation and flooding that can negatively impact the
safety performance as well as the operational aspects of ships. The study proposed
several safety measures to remove or minimise the root causes expected in case of
hydrogen leakage. Moreover, the study indicates that learning from previous incidents
is an effective technique, particularly when data about the technology to investigate is
so scarce. Such information gleaned from the investigation of occurrences may be of
assistance in the process of risk assessment.
KEYWORDS: Hazard analysis, HFC, Sustainable fuel, Safety aspects, Incident
database, safety measures, lesson learnt, Delphi rounds.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background
Organizations and industry are collaborating to curb climate pollution across all

sectors, as rising CO2 level contributes to global warming. Globally, maritime industry
use of energy was estimated at 19% in 2015. This figure is expected to hold steady in
2040, according to data from the US Energy information administration (EIA) (EIA,
2017). In fact, 90% of world trade is shipped by sea in which more than 56,000
merchant vessels operate on a global scale (“merchant fleet”, 2021). In particular, 99
% of the world's fleet is propelled by internal combustion engines with fossil fuels
(Rattazzi et al., 2021).
According to recent data conducted by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), 300 million tons of fossil fuels are used annually (Ammar, 2019). Within the
period from 2012 to 2018, IMO recorded a rise in green house (GHG) emissions of
977 million tons to 1076 million tons and CO2 emissions from 962 million tons to
1056 million tons (Wijayanto, 2020). Therefore, it is estimated that around 3.1 % of
the total CO2 emissions is attributed to ship emissions (Balcombe et al., 2019), and if
business as usual continues, IMO predicts 50 to 250 percent CO2 emissions by 2050
(Linstad et al., 2015). Thus, recent IMO efforts and regulations require minimizing as
much as possible CO2 and GHG emissions.
As part of this, the energy efficiency regulations were properly established to
address CO2 issues, and this resulted in the creation of the mandatory Energy
Efficiency Designs Index (EEDI) for new ships, which promotes the use of more
energy-efficient equipment and engines. Moreover, some energy efficiency techniques
are introduced to increase the energy efficiency of ship in a value manner as
demonstrated by the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and the
following Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI). This latter, EEOI, was
adopted for the purpose to underline the voyage efficiency by taking into account the
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ton CO2 per ship (Yalcin et al., 2020). Furthermore, the IMO decided in 2018 to
develop an initial strategy to address the environmental problem of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions caused by shipping activities. The goal of this strategy is to gradually
eliminate GHG emissions from international shipping (Yalcin et al., 2020).
Despite the fact that there are various ways to achieve decarbonisation, the
utilisation of alternative fuels still appears in all of the strategy terms. The use of
batteries is also a solution to fulfil the global climate goals, as stated by Mao et al
(2021). In this essence, the H2020 project TrAm of the European Union has resulted
in the development of battery-powered vessels that have demonstrated their
compliance with the IMO's GHG reduction requirements. Another friendly energy
source is hydrogen, which has gained a lot interest during the latest years in the
maritime sector (Georgeff et al., 2020). One main advantage of hydrogen is that can
be produced in a sustainable manner trough renewable energy, and it is an emission
free of greenhouse gases when used. These alternatives are indeed promoting the
complete decarbonizing for maritime transport (Inal et al., 2018).
For more than half a century, hydrogen has been applied as fuel, most prominently
in space missions as rocket fuel (Granath, 2017). However, hydrogen has recently been
exploited to power automobiles, buses, trucks, and ferries (Hall et al., 2018). It is
available as a compressed gas (CH2) or a liquid (LH2) and can be utilized in either a
fuel cell or an internal combustion engine (ICE). In 1842, William Grove invented the
use of a fuel cell as a generator of electricity (Basu, 2007). Fuel cells have not been
generally considered for general application due to the success and efficiency of
combustion engines. Furthermore, fuel cells have only lately been used in specialized
applications like space exploration and submarines. Due to the stringent emission
regulations in the shipping industry, there has been an increased emphasis on the
development of fuel cells as a viable option due to their high efficiency and low
emissions (Inal et al., 2018). By eliminating NOX, SOX, and particle (PM) emissions
and substantially reducing CO2 emissions, fuel cell propulsion can meet current
environmental regulations and ensure the sustainable development of the shipping
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industry. Long-term use of hydrogen fuel derived from renewable energy sources
could produce carbon-neutral ships (Linstad et al., 2015).
Currently, shipping faces the difficulty of diversifying the available fuels for onboard use (Tronstad et al., 2017). The use of this type of fuel, which has a low flash
point, on ships necessitates the implementation of numerous requirements in order to
comply with maritime regulations. Regarding hydrogen and fuel cells, the review of
maritime regulations revealed that there are currently no internationally accepted
regulations for the use of this new technology (Tronstad et al., 2017). However, there
are regulations and guidelines that are of relevance for the concept installation. The
International Code of Safety for Ship Using Gases or Other Low-flashpoint Fuels, IGF
Code, is one of the primary codes that regulate safety instruction for the use of gases
or other substances with a low flashpoint (Linstad et al., 2015). This latter establishes
the specifications for the design and operation of liquefied natural gas-fuelled ships.
However, it should be noted that there are no prescriptive regulation specifically
addressing the safety use of HFC insulation. Additional zero-emission technologies
could be a solution for ships, but they pose new safety concerns and obstacles in the
construction of ships, including weight limitations and internal arrangement
restrictions (Linstad et al., 2015).
Many attempts are being undertaken to gain a better knowledge of hydrogen safety
concerns while dealing with fuel cells for use in shipping applications. To use HFC
safely, however, additional regulatory standards must be developed. Led by DNV, 26
major associations and organizations have published a handbook on hydrogenpowered vessels in an effort to shed light on the most pressing regulatory issues
surrounding hydrogen as a ship fuel cell. In addition, the MarHySafe joint
development project (JDP) has been established to enhance knowledge of the safety
of hydrogen operations in shipping, including the regulatory framework that addresses
knowledge gaps regarding the safe handling, storage, and bunkering of hydrogen, as
well as hydrogen's unique properties that make it difficult to manage (Linstad et al.,
2015).
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HFC technologies have many hazards and risks associated with them. Not least, a
catastrophic failure in any HFC project could harm the stakeholder’s opinion of HFC
and hinder the capacity of HFC technologies to obtain insurance clearance, which is a
prerequisite for commercialization. Therefore, the successful transition to hydrogen
fuel cells is highly dependent on the assessment of HFC safety and associated risks
that are likely to occur on ships. Additionally, as mentioned previousely, there are no
specific rules and regulations governing the use of HFC on ships. Aside from this,
there are only a few of standard risk assessment methodologies for evaluating the risks
associated with the use of hydrogen and fuel cells in maritime applications.

1.2

Problem statement
As the number of ships expected to be deployed in the future rises, so does the

importance of understanding the risks and repercussions of maritime incidents
involving hydrogen fuel cell as a preventative measure to eliminate the dangers. With
regard to Hydrogen use on merchant ships, unless appropriate safety measures and
practices are implemented, the properties of hydrogen may increase the overall risk
aboard ships relative to other fuels. When hydrogen fuel and fuel cells are used on
ships, especially in enclosed spaces such as fuel cell space and hydrogen storage space,
there is a risk of low flash fuel leakage, which poses a fire and explosion hazard. As a
direct result, hydrogen safety and leaks have attracted a great deal of attention, which
requires prompt resolution. Notwithstanding, hydrogen has been put to work in a
variety of other transport applications such as light duty vehicles, buses in tunnels or
hydrogen refuelling station across. This means that regulations, standards and codes
covering industrial use are already in place. In maritime context, the global maritime
community trend towards reducing air pollution from ships has highlighted a new
focus on the use of HFC to propel vessels. However, there is a lack in regulations about
this new technology in the maritime context. The question that emerges from this
statement is as follows: How can the use of HFC on board ships be achievable without
compromising maritime safety?
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1.3

Aims and objectives
The purpose of this study is to analyse hazards associated with the use of HFC in

ships. The paper first discusses the potential dangers that could arise from using HFC
as a powered fuel. Based on previous accidents that have been occurred in various
industries, a hazard identification (HAZID) analysis will be conducted to investigate
the root causes and consequences of hazardous events that may happen on board HFC
ships. Then, the study will attempt to identify possible safety barriers that need to be
incorporated into the maritime system. The research could facilitate policy makers to
integrate the new technology in decarbonisation goals without jeopardising the safety
in maritime application.

1.4

Research questions
Any new technology introduced into the maritime industry is required to undergo

extensive research and development before it can be implemented on ships. This is
done to ensure that the potential hazards posed by the new technology are not
significantly greater than those posed by the technologies already in use. In this study,
the following questions will be addressed as bellow:
1. What are the risks associated with the future operation of Fuel-cell powered
ships?
2. What is the perception of maritime professionals regarding the risks that might
be linked to the use of HFC on board ships?
3. What are the lessons learned from accident data of fuel cell technology in other
industries to assess the risks of fuel-cell powered ships?
4. What are the safety measures that can be implemented to navigate safely on
board HFC vessels?
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1.5

Composition of dissertation
There are six sections to the dissertation. Chapter one contains the background, the

problem statement, the aim and objectives, and content of the dissertation. The second
chapter is a literature review that primarily explores the topic of hydrogen and fuel
cell, with a special emphasis on safety concerns in maritime application. The methods,
such as how the Delphi rounds and interviews were conducted, as well as how to
conduct an exploratory HAZID study based on past knowledge from various
industries, are described in Chapter 3. Besides the results of Delphi Rounds, chapter
four describes and analyses accidents involving hydrogen on the EMARs database.
The chapter 5 discusses the finding of the research and its limitation. The final chapter
draws some final conclusions and make some suggestions for the future of the
research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Hydrogen Fuel Cell (HFC) in the maritime industry
Due to the various challenges that are harming the environment, tightened

emissions control have been set for more sustainable future with zero carbon content
in various industries. The International Maritime (IMO), a specialised agency of UN
responsible to regulate environmental protection for shipping internationally, is
seeking to halve GHG emissions from international shipping by 2050 and, to more
extent, eliminating them completely in the 21 century (Georgeff et al., 2020). For this
concern and for the purpose of keeping international shipping safe, environmentally
friendly, energy efficient and secure, IMO has recently been focussed on a regulatory
framework necessary for a green and sustainable maritime transportation. A paradigm
shift has opened the door to new alternative propulsion options as the maritime
industry evolves.
Many vessels are sailing the world carrying out the global supply chain that
society depends upon. Whilst maritime activities being recognized as an effective
means of transportation, fossil fuels are still in use to propel 99% of the worldwide
fleet, which has led to serious emission concerns regarding pollutants and greenhouse
gases (IMO, 2014). Based on some statistics, 2.9% of global greenhouse gases are
emitted by ships in all kind of categories, making the shipping industry hard to abate
(Georgeff et al., 2020). Despite all the efforts, there are increasing amounts of carbon
dioxide (CO2), sulphur oxides (SOX), nitrogen oxides (NOX), particulate matter
(PM), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and other harmful gases that are released
as exhaust gases generated by the combustion of fossil fuels in marine engines (IMO,
2014). These emissions have dangerous effects on people and the environment. If the
maritime community remain abstaining to mitigate such issues, there is a high
expectation that emissions will increase further due to many factors such as the global
economic growth, increase in international trade, and the need of shipping demand.

16

In terms of sustainability of shipping activities, fossil fuel use poses a serious
problem. This has led to an increase in the development of new propulsion systems in
recent years (Inal et al., 2022). In this regards, introducing hydrogen fuel cells (HFCs)
as a power source for marine propulsion is viewed as a promising solution for
completely decarbonizing maritime transport (Inal et al., 2022). In comparison to landbased industries, the HFC technology have demonstrated a certain level of acceptance
in terms of construction technology and operating parameters (Spada et al., 2018).
Potential benefits of the use of HFC have been investigated, mainly including
no pollution, high efficiency, great energy density, favourable stability and low noise
(Borman, 1998). Due to the portfolio’s advantages cited previously, it has gradually
attracted a great deal of attention in the shipping industry. Moreover, the application
of hydrogen fuel cells in vessels has promoted the development of clean energy (Inal
et al., 2022). Currently, the HFC technology is being used on a few vessels, such as
Viking Lady, Alsterwasser, Tianxiang, SF BREEZE and others (Li et al., 2018). From
the perspective of clean energy propulsion, these vessels have been dubbed as the most
environmentally friendly in history.
From a safety standpoint, the risks associated with the use of HFC aboard ships
have not yet been adequately addressed for two reasons: on the one hand, there is a
lack of understanding of hydrogen safety in such complex environments due to the
novelty of the product and its limitations in commercial shipping (Li et al., 2018). On
the other hand, as indicated by number of studies, fuel cell technologies pose unique
safety challenges compared to conventional fuels (Spada et al., 2018). Consequently,
safety is a crucial aspect that must be addressed during the period of maritime
decarbonisation, necessitating the development of proactive responses to emerging
risks and the continuation of current procedures for well-known dangers.
Hydrogen (H2) properties include high leakage and diffusion, low ignition
energy, large spectrum of fuel explosions and powerful explosion energy (Rigas et al.,
2012), volume fraction of ignition throughout a range 4–74%, explosion volume
fraction ranged from 18 to 59%, and minimum ignition energy of 0.02 m J (Rigas &
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Amyotte, 2012). The hydrogen when it leaks can therefore reach easily other
compartment due to its high diffusion characteristics, and consequently, there would
be extremely severe issues resulting from series of chain reactions such as fire and
explosion. Additionally, hydrogen is a colourless gas. It exists as a diatomic molecule
when it is in its natural condition. There are two types of isotopes that can be found in
hydrogen: simple hydrogen and heavy hydrogen, which is known as deuterium.
However, the super-heavy form of hydrogen, known as tritium, decays radioactively
and is therefore almost never encountered in nature. As a result, it is important to focus
on safety aspects when a hydrogen fuel cell is being deployed to ships. The
fundamental properties of hydrogen are presented in Table 1.
From ship’s point of view, When HFC technology is applied as new system of
propulsion, a very specific method is applied in order to classify the hazardous zones
where unwanted events may occur. It is highly important to indicate that the fuel cell
space and the hydrogen storage space are regarded as hazardous areas because of high
the high possibility of leaks that might occur in both areas (Tronstad et al., 2017).
Many authors focused on the application of several fuel cell powered ship projects in
Europe, put forward different design schemes, and compared the efficiency and
economy (Ghenai et al.,2019). Among others, Vogler (2009) compiled a number of
instances of fuel cell-powered ships and suggested some general precautions to avoid
hydrogen fuel leakage.
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Table 1
Fundamental properties of hydrogen
Property

Hydrogen

Density at 1 atm and 300 k

0,087 Kg /m3

Stoichiometric composition in air

9,48 vol.%

Lower heating value

46.72 MJ/Kg

Minimum ignition energy

0,28 mJ

Laminar flame speed at NTP

0,16 m/s

Auto ignition temperature

550°C

Stoichiometric air fuel ratio

34.5:1

Adiabatic flame temperature

2214°C

Mass diffusivity in air

0.06 cm2/s

Note. Adapted from The hazards and risks of hydrogen, by Crowl, D. A., & Jo, Y. D.
(2007), Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 20(2), 158-164,
(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2007.02.002).

2.2

Fundamental principle of fuel cells
Fuel cells are electrochemical devices that convert the chemical energy in fuels

directly into electrical energy (Baroutaji et al., 2019). Fuel cells are not limited by the
thermodynamic constraints of heat engines, such as the Carnot efficiency of a heat
engine, due to the absence of heat and mechanical work generation (Baroutaji et al.,
2019). Due to the absence of a combustion process, fuel cells generate electricity while
emitting minimal pollution (EG&G, 2004).
The fundamental physical structure of standard fuel cells is depicted in Figure 1.
A fuel cell is composed of an anode (negative electrode) and a cathode (positive
electrode) encasing an electrolyte (Larminie et al., 2003). The cathode receives oxygen
and the anode receives fuel. When activated by a catalyst, hydrogen atoms split into
protons and electrons (Larminie et al., 2003). The external circuit is traversed by
electrons, resulting in the flow of electricity. Electrolytes transport protons to the
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cathode. When protons recombine with oxygen and electrons, they produce water and
heat (IEA, 2004).

Figure 1
Symbolic representation of individual generic fuel cells

Note. Adapted from Fuel cell engines. John Wiley & Sons by Mench, M. M. (2008).

As shown in Figure 2, fuel cell power systems typically include three main
components, namely H2 storage, Fuel Cell Power Stack, and a DC/AC Power Inverter
(Larminie et al., 2003). In stacks of fuel cells, individual cells are electrically
connected to produce units with the desired output capacity. Theoretically, increasing
the electrode surface area and reactant flow rate enables a single fuel cell to generate
any amount of current and power. However, due to electrochemical potential
limitations, the output voltage of individual fuel cells operating under realistic
conditions is always less than 1 volt. Consequently, a stack of fuel cells consists of a
series of connected individual cells. The Balance of plant (BoP) includes the following
elements:
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Feed stream modification (including a fuel processor if needed): Before
delivering hydrogen-rich gas to the fuel stack, the fuel processor or reformer
must convert fuel to hydrogen-rich gas and purify it;



Air delivery: it includes air compressors or blowers and air filters in the
majority of practical fuel cell systems;



Temperature control: all fuel cell systems require stack temperature
management;



Control of water resources: water is a reaction product and a requirement in
some fuel cell areas. Most fuel cell systems need water management systems
to prevent adding water to fuel and ensure smooth operation; and



DC/AC Power Inverter: It converts fuel stack electricity into the desired output.
After installing voltage and power monitoring and control devices, DC current
can be drawn straight from the stack. Fuel cells generate direct current (DC).
If AC is needed, the power conditioner includes an inverter.

This latter, the fuel cell controller, controls start-up power, stack cooling, gas flow,
and close-down operation during power and hold on. Microprocessors and sensors
measure temperature and gas flow. Most fuel cell systems' weight, volume, and cost
come from their batteries (BoP) (Larminie et al., 2003).
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Figure 2
Principal fuel cell system components

Note. Adapted from Design of a PEM fuel cell system for residential application. by
Gencoglu, M. T., & Ural, Z. (2009), international journal of hydrogen energy
34(12), 5242-5248, (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2008.09.038).

2.3

Fuel cells in shipping application
As with many new technologies, military research inspired fuel cells. Despite

being discovered in the early 1800s, the principle was not applied until the mid-20th
century (Larminie et al., 2003). US Navy fuel cell research began in the 1960s. In
contrast, the German submarine industry and the Ministry of Defense came to the
conclusion in the 1970s that fuel cells provided the most efficient solution for air
independent propulsion (AIP) for electric diesel submarines. This made it possible for
the submarines to remain submerged for longer periods of time (Mart& Margeridis,
1995). The Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) has been involved in
the development of PEMFC technology since the mid-1980s (Weaver, 2002). UTC
developed an alkaline fuel cell system for a US Navy deep submergence search
vehicle. Deep Quest was equipped with UTC 30 kW alkaline fuel cells in 1978.
Congress (1986) and Andudjar (2009) said Bacon developed fuel cells for submarines
during World War II, but a paper shows the British Royal Navy adopted PEM
technology in the 1980s (Smithsonian, 2004).
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Compared to land-based applications, fuel cell adoption in surface ships is slow.
Fuel cell research on surface ships began in 1996. Within this year, the German Mussel
Fishers Association decided to equip their fleet with eco-friendly propulsion. Fuel cells
can replace diesel generators. In 1997, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) began
developing a ship service fuel cell (SSFC) module. 2004-EG&G Several FC-powered
passenger vessels have been developed and demonstrated in response to the growing
number of lakes in Europe where internal combustion engine-powered motor boating
is restricted or banned to prevent pollution. In Switzerland, a pedalo-style boat
powered by PSI's 100 W PEMFC stack was the first prototype. In Finland, Hydrocell
Oy demonstrated a small fuel cell-powered boat (Weaver, 2002). EU started the
FCSHIP project in July 2002 for two years. The Norwegian Ship-owners Association
leads the 21-member project consortium. Most fuel cell demonstrations involve
sailboats or yachts. Yuasa Corporation Japan used DMFC to power the 5.8-meter
Malt's Mermaid III sailboat in 2002 (Cropper, 2004). MTU CFC unveiled a 12-meter
PEM-powered sailboat in October 2003. The vessel is powered by a 20-kW unit codeveloped with Ballard. She can travel 225 km at 6 km/h and is the first fuel cellpowered vessel to receive GL certification. Haveblue XVI sailboat prototype debuted
in 2005 (Adamson, 2005). Voller installed their Emerald PEM APU on a Beneteau
Oceanis yacht for fuel cell engineering trials in 2007. Icelandic New Energy
supervised the installation of the Smart H2's hybrid hydrogen fuel cells APU
(Hydrogen, 2008).
The UNIDO International Centre for Hydrogen Energy Technologies in Turkey
contracted Hydrogenics to supply six 30 kW PEMFC power modules for a 50passenger sightseeing boat (McConnel, 2010). The Viking Lady is the first commercial
vessel with marine fuel cells. On April 29, 2009, Eidesvik Offshore got the Viking
Lady. DNV classifies the ship as a North Sea supply vessel. Viking lady is the result
of the 2003 FellowSHIP project, which aimed to develop power packs that reduce CO2
emissions by up to 50% and increase energy efficiency by up to 30%. Nitrogen oxides,
sulphur oxides, and particles will be completely eliminated. FellowSHIP also includes
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power integration, safety and reliability studies, approval, and rule development
(Facts, 2009).
The Dutch green tug project and Smit E3 Tug are others. Hydrogen and fuel cell
technology benefit from a National Innovation Program (NIP). The NIP's first marine
R&D project is e4 ships. It began in July 2009 and ends in 2016. Its goal is to show
that fuel cells can work in ships' power supply systems under everyday conditions to
promote cleaner energy generation in merchant shipping (IMO, 2009). The project
involves 17 German institutions, including shipyards and shipping companies, fuel cell
manufacturers, universities, associations, and classification organizations like GL,
DNV, MTU On-site energy, and ZBT (e4ship, 2009). In June 2010, 20 kW SOFC was
installed in Undine.
METHAPU is a consortium of Wartsila, Wallenius Marine, Lloyd's Register, Det
Norske Veritas (DNV), and the University of Genoa in Italy. The project aims to
validate and demonstrate new technologies that can reduce ship emissions. Also, it
aims to establish international regulations for using methanol on commercial ships and
as a marine fuel (Tronstad, 2017). This could indicate the emergence of fuel cells as a
technology to solve environmental issues and their growth potential.
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Figure 3
Maritime fuel cell project numbers since 2000

Note. Adapted from The potential of fuel cells as a drive source of maritime
transport by Markowski, J., & Pielecha, I. (2019). In IOP Conference Series: Earth
and Environmental Science (Vol. 214, No. 1, p. 012019). IOP Publishing,
(https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/214/1/012019).
Figure 3 shows the number of surface ship fuel cell projects from 2000 to 2019.
Recession may have affected fuel cell development. The early 2000s recession may
have affected the lowest trend line graph in developed nations. The late-2000s
recession may have caused a second downturn.
Moreover, fuel cells are being incorporated into a variety of future ship designs
that are environmentally friendly. In April 2009, NYK released a preliminary
exploratory design for the NYK Super Eco Ship 2030. This vessel is anticipated to be
significantly more energy-efficient and emit significantly less carbon dioxide than
other vessels. It will utilize cutting-edge technologies that are widely available by
2030. It is possible to reduce the amount of power required to propel a ship by
decreasing the hull's mass and water resistance. Increasing propulsion power through
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the use of fuel cells powered by LNG, solar cells, and wind energy will reduce CO2
emissions by 69% per container transported (NYK, 2009). Wallenius Wilhelmsen also
incorporated a futuristic concept into the design of the E/S Orcelle, a car carrier
capable of carrying up to 10,000 vehicles on eight cargo decks. It has a pentameral
hull, which eliminates the traditional stern propeller and rudder, thereby eliminating
the need for ballast water. During its voyage, the E/S Orcelle will produce zero
emissions. It is powered by the intelligent use of energy from renewable sources, such
as solar energy, wind energy, and wave energy, and will be used in tandem with a
hydrogen-powered fuel cell system. According to Wallenius Wilhelmsen, future
technologies will have the capacity to convert solar, wind, and wave energy into
hydrogen that can be used immediately or stored on board (Wallenius, 2010).

2.4

Safety issues associated with HFC
Concerns about the safety of fuel cells include the potential for fire, explosion,

asphyxia, and electrical shock. The primary focus, however, is on the fire and
explosion risks associated with the system's hydrogen content. The mixture of
hydrogen and air, a combustible gas, is explosive. In reality, a wide variety of
air/hydrogen concentrations can trigger an explosion. Four percent by volume to
seventy-five percent by volume of hydrogen can spontaneously ignite. Hydrogen and
air mixtures in a confined space pose a significant risk of explosion under these
conditions. In addition, the ignition energy necessary to initiate a hydrogen/air
explosion is incredibly low, requiring only 0.02 mJ. In the event of a breach, hydrogen
quickly dissipates upwards due to its greater buoyancy than air. These characteristics
will serve to reduce the likelihood of an explosive atmosphere forming as a result of
the leak occurring in a well-ventilated area.
As an aside, a hydrogen leak in an enclosed space containing electrical equipment
or other sources of ignition can result in an explosion (Newsholme, 2004). When an
ignition source is nearby, high barriers such as ceilings and other impermeable surfaces
pose a heightened risk (Newsholme, 2004). Consequently, fuel cell safety can be
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ensured by referring to classification organization-developed standards. If fuel cells
are not adequately sealed, gas leaks and explosive atmospheres could result in terms
of safety.
The fundamental principle of the laws is that, in comparison to conventional
machinery, the level of safety cannot be reduced when using gas. In addition to the
existing "intrinsically gas safe" system for pipe that contains flammable gas, the
"emergency shutdown protected machinery (ESD)" concept has been developed. In
most circumstances, emergency shutdown-protected machinery areas are considered
gas-safe, but in rare cases they may become gas-hazardous. In such situations, all
machinery and ignition sources not protected by explosion protection must
automatically shut down (Vogler, 2008).
An additional danger that needs to be taken in consideration is the life-threatening
hazard of electricity (Newsholme, 2004). Both the regular 240-volt mains A.C. power
source, as well as direct output of the fuel cell stack, poses electrical risks in fuel cell
installations. The total output from the stack can be in the range of 200-400 volts and
500 amps, despite the fact that the voltages and currents produced by each element in
the stack are extremely modest. A prevalent problem is a lack of management over
risky places, such as areas where unprotected bus bars are present (Newsholme, 2004).
Despite the additional risks associated with the use of fuel cells, it appears that this
problem can be successfully resolved by adhering to a set of clearly defined and strictly
enforced criteria during the design and operation phases.

2.5

Regulatory perspective of HFC use in shipping
It has been highlighted that hydrogen has a high probability of leakage and

diffusion. Since it has also a very large spectrum of fuel explosions and powerful
explosion energy (Rigas et al.,2012), fire and explosion have to be considered when
dealing with hydrogen. Given these facts, working around hydrogen on board has the
potential to expose the crew to toxic chemicals, including fire and explosion risks in
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case of leaks. However, environmental and safety standards are becoming increasingly
vital due to the fact that activities that maintain shipping are highly important to
helping supply and demand chains. This is because sustain shipping activities are very
important to helping supply and demand chains (Rattazzi et al., 2021).
In terms of regulatory perspective, an initial strategy has been adopted in 2018 by
IMO in order to downsize GHG emissions 50% by 2050 compared to 2008 rates
(Rattazzi et al., 2021). In 2021, IMO's Subcommittee on Cargoes and Containers (CCC
7) finalized draft guidelines that have been assigned for development of standards
specifically for ships using fuel cells (Rattazzi et al., 2021). The guidelines in this draft
provide information on fire and gas/vapour detection to prevent fuel cell-related
damages. Moreover, The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has carried out
an in-depth technical study on the application of fuel cells in shipping with the purpose
of performing a safety assessment. This study also included an analysis of the potential
risks posed by this emerging technology (Tronstad, 2017). In light of upcoming
environmental restrictions and the further advancement of fuel cell and hydrogen
technologies, European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) is establishing a specific
activity to promote maritime fuel cell projects and hydrogen technology (Tronstad et
al., 2017).
As this new type of energy power is considered to have a low flash point, all
matters relating to it are governed by the international code of safety for ships using
gases or other low-flashpoint fuels (IGF Code) (Tronstad et al., 2017). The IGF Code
entered into force in 2017 aiming to reduce the risks which may happen to the ship, to
the crew and to the environment. However, this code addresses only concerns arising
from the use of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Consequently, the subcommittee
established an enhanced work plan for developing safety measures for new lowflashpoint fuels under the IGF Code, which will be consideration by MSC 105
(Tronstad et al., 2017). In this regards, further pre-normative work will be needed to
have wider compliance with hydrogen fuel cell use on board ships.
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Current regulations ban the use of hydrogen fuel cells as propulsion power.
However, classification societies and other players are conducting risk assessments to
provide advice and guidance that will contribute to the establishment of new
regulations and standards (Ash & Scarbrough, 2019).

2.6

Hydrogen technologies in the maritime industry
Currently, compressed hydrogen is used to demonstrate the viability of

hydrogen in the maritime shipping industry. Hydroville is the first seaworthy
passenger vessel in the world to be powered by dual-fuel hydrogen combustion
engines. She was designed by the Belgian ship owner CMB (CMB, 2020). The
shipowner has recently formed a joint venture called BeHydro with the aid of engine
manufacturer ABC engines (Garmsiri et al., 2013). This demonstrates, more than
anything else, the interest and potential of shipowners in H2-fueled engines. Ships
powered by fuel cells and hydrogen have also been demonstrated, albeit to a lesser
extent; the Duffy–Herreshoff water taxi and the Yacht XV are two examples (Garmsiri
et al., 2013).
HySeas III project also uses hydrogen-powered ships to ferry people around
the Scottish Orkney Islands (Gomez Trillos et al.,2013). The Technical University of
Berlin studied hydrogen propulsion for the RiverCell-Elektra towboat. The ZemShip
Alsterwasser demonstrated hydrogen as a shipping fuel near Hamburg (Pratt&
Klebanoff, 2018). Nemo H2 in Amsterdam, Hornblower Hybrid and Hydrogenesis in
Bristol, MF Vlgen173 and SF-Breeze near San Francisco are examples of hydrogenpowered passenger vessels (Pratt& Klebanoff, 2016).
2.6.1

On-board end use
Hydrogen is commonly associated with fuel cells in energy systems, but it can

also be burned in diesel and gasoline engines. Hydrogen can be used in these
combustion engines as the sole fuel (mono fuel) or as part of a dual fuel system
(Dimitriou & Tsujimura, 2017). Some storage methods also require the use of reactors
to release the hydrogen before it can be utilized in an engine or fuel cell. The final
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product of hydrogen, whether it is burned or used in a fuel cell, is always water. In
terms of emissions, the amount of nitrogen oxides (NOx) that fuel cells emit versus
combustion engines is the most significant (Heffel, 2003). Fuel cells have a higher
energy efficiency than internal combustion engines, but they are significantly more
expensive and typically have a shorter lifespan (Braga et al., 2014). While combustion
engines have been used in the maritime industry for decades, fuel cells are still a
novelty in the industry today (Ahmadi et al., 2020).
2.6.2

Fuel cells
Hydrogen is the most commonly used fuel source for fuel cells (FCs). As an

electrolyser system, fuel cells operate in the opposite direction of this review's
emphasis on its particular operations. This means that at the electrodes of the fuel cell,
the fuel is broken down into its constituent parts and electricity is generated. To use
fuel cells as the primary ship propulsion system, a ship must be electrified, whereas
the rotor is currently powered by a mechanical engine. There are many different types
of fuel cells, such as proton exchange membrane fuel cells (PEMFC), molten
carbonate fuel cells, and solid oxide fuel cells. The PEMFC system is one of the most
widely used fuel cells, but it is limited by its need for ultrapure hydrogen and its
susceptibility to CO and ammonia poisoning (Lan et Tao, 2014). Systems like molten
carbonate fuel cells and solid oxide fuel cells are being studied as they are more
poison-resistant at higher temperatures (Sasaki et al., 2006). Additionally, the PEMFC
has been improved by employing membranes that can withstand higher temperatures
(Verma & Scott, 2010). Due to the high temperatures at which molten carbonate and
solid oxide fuel cells operate, they can immediately degrade hydrocarbons and
ammonia within the cell (Wojcik et al.,2003). Due to the high temperatures generated
by fuel cells, NOx production can still be a problem (Chuahy & Kokjohn, 2019).
2.6.3

Hazards of on-board use

First, it must be acknowledged that hydrogen has a negative reputation when it
comes to safety. The phobia of this molecule can be traced back to the Hindenburg
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disaster in 1937; the destruction of this airship instilled in the public a fear of hydrogen
use. It is also suggested that the public be better informed about the usage of hydrogen
as an alternative to fossil fuels (Pratt& Klebanoff,2016). The low ignition energy of
0.017 mJ, coupled with hydrogen's wide range of flammability (4–75 vol % in air),
results in an easily ignitable fuel. Because hydrogen is a fuel, it must be combustible.
It should be noted that small molecules like hydrogen can escape from even the most
impermeable pipework or storage containers. In addition to its high diffusivity, this is
one of its key advantages. In the open air, hydrogen disperses quickly because it is so
light (Saffers & Molkov, 2014). Additionally, there are hydrogen detectors capable of
detecting a level of hydrogen 100 times lower than the explosion limit (Xiao et al.,
2018). Aside from that, excessive amounts of hydrogen, an odourless, colourless gas,
can cause asphyxiation by displacing oxygen in the atmosphere. The discharge of
hydrogen in a compressed state must be managed to avoid the risk of explosions. The
tanks are built to withstand bullet strikes, therefore the tanks are safe to store in
(Paczkowski, 2004). It is necessary to use materials that can resist extremely cold
temperatures when storing hydrogen in a cryogenic liquid form, such as liquid
hydrogen at 253 degrees Celsius or S-LNG at 162 degrees Celsius. Damage to the
ship's hull may result if the cryogenic liquid leaks out of its containers. Because of the
liquid's evaporation in the air, larger spills of liquid hydrogen or LNG quickly chill the
ground surface. The cold fracture of the steel in the ship's hull can be caused by spills,
and this can result in the ship's hull being damaged (Mokhatab et al., 2013). After the
release of cryogenic liquids, extremely cold vapour clouds are produced. People
working aboard the ship are at risk because of the low temperatures caused by these
vapour clouds. Water vapour in cryogenic liquid clouds makes them heavier than air,
which prevents them from dispersing like gaseous fuels, which do. As a result,
asphyxiation and explosion risks are exacerbated. The Fischer–Tropsch diesels are
predicted to provide no new dangers because of their similarity to conventional fuels.
The carbon chain molecules in FTS diesels are identical to those found in conventional
diesel fuel, despite the fact that recycling CO2 makes them appear to be a greener fuel.
Because of this, oil spills from FTS diesels have a smaller negative impact on the
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environment than spills from ordinary crude oil diesels. Contrast this with the
biodegradability of methanol, which is very water-soluble and rapidly degrades. As a
result, compared to diesel fuel spills, methanol spills from ships have a much smaller
environmental impact. When compared to diesel, the boiling point of methanol is 65
degrees Celsius, while the flashpoint is 11 degrees Celsius. Methanol, on the other
hand, has a larger chance of catching fire than diesel. The lethal dose for ingesting
methanol is on the order of 56.2 grammes per person, while the lethal concentration
for inhaling it is between 4000 and 13 000 parts per million (Moon,2017). There will
be increased monitoring of methanol levels around ship's engine rooms and fuel tanks
to ensure crew safety because methanol evaporates five times faster than water. Longterm exposure to methanol, even at low levels, can cause health problems
(Verbruggen, 2015). Because formic acid is a commonly produced chemical, it may
be handled and transported with ease. This hydrogen carrier can thus be used as a ship's
fuel because tanks and pumps to transfer it are readily available (Apter et al., 1994). It
is still a caustic substance that can inflict severe burns to the skin and eyes, however.
Despite the fact that it is less prone to evaporate than methanol, formic acid should
nevertheless be monitored in enclosed areas on the ship to ensure that the ship's air is
not polluted by formic acid.
Under normal atmospheric conditions, ammonia and hydrogen are both invisible,
but ammonia has a very strong smell, and the human olfactory sense can detect
ammonia at 50 ppm. The ammonium ion (NH4 +), which is very alkaline and produces
burns on animal tissue, notably in the respiratory system and the eyes, is formed when
ammonia comes into contact with damp surfaces (Nowatzki, 2008). Large
concentrations of ammonia will produce clouds that are heavier and more easily blown
by the wind. There can be fatalities even hundreds of metres away from where the
ammonia cloud is being inhaled because of the dangerous region that can be covered
by it(‘exposure guideline’, 2010). The safety record of DBT is excellent. High boiling
and auto-ignition temperatures indicate that only very low fire or explosion risks are
associated with this transporter. While DBT and hydrogenated H18–DBT share many
of the same chemical properties as diesel, they are predicted to be safer for the
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environment and last for a shorter time on a vehicle's fuel tank. As a result, the toxicity
of DBT is more difficult to determine because it comprises a variety of regioisomers.
It has just three aromatic rings and no excessive branching, according to a set of rules
of thumb given by Boethling et al (2007). DBT does not have a high halogenation
level, a high number of aromatic rings, or excessive branching. Not only are diesel
fuels not environmentally friendly, but this chemical is not biodegradable or
biodegradable. The use of hydrogen as a zero-carbon fuel is possible; however, it
comes with the same safety issues as fossil fuels that do produce CO2. There is a
difference in the stability of the carriers in the solid-state hydrogen storage systems.
Hydrogen carriers should be kept out of the reach of both air and moisture (Cao et al.,
2018). According to the MSDS (2020) it is necessary to keep NaBH4, NaAlH4, and
MgH2 out of direct contact with water. If this is not the case, the carrier's hydrogen
will be released, which could be dangerous if it happens while bunkering or sailing.
In conclusion, numerous efforts have been made by policymakers, stakeholders,
and the research community for the use of hydrogen fuel cells in the shipping industry
in an effort to fill knowledge gaps regarding hydrogen safety. However, there are
currently a number of regulations that do not align with safety-specific requirements
for the application of hydrogen fuel cells. Hydrogen poses a significant hazard, so risk
assessment methodology appeared to be the most effective means of addressing safety
concerns. In this context, additional research is required to evaluate the safety of ships
equipped with hydrogen fuel cells, to aid policymakers, and to develop pertinent codes,
including the IGF code and related rules.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study employs a three-phase methodology: HAZID through examination
of Hydrogen fuel cells accidents in various industries; and expert interview based on
Delphi method to identify the most critical risks and the potential consequences that
can result from the use of HFC on board ship. In the end; a proposed safety barriers
analysis will be proposed and validated by two of professionals of the World Maritime
University (WMU). The flowchart in Figure outlines the hazards and safety measures
followed in the research methodology.
Figure 4
Research methodology design (Designed by the Author)

3.1

Accidents database to support risk assessment process
Hydrogen has already been safely used for decades in a variety of industrial

application areas, such as aerospace technology, chemical processing including
refineries, fertilisers, food and electronic industries, etc. (Wen et al., 2022).
Accordingly, hydrogen and fuel cells technologies are expected to play a key role in
implementing the transition of the energy systems from fossil-fuel-based to a more
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sustainable energy (Linstad et al., 2015). In order to deploy this type of energy on a
large scale, the aspect of safety needs to be addressed to ensure at least the same level
of safety as the technologies that are currently in use.
With regards to safety research, one of the most methods used in industry to
develop and improve safety strategies for a specific technology is the return of
experience obtained from its previous deployments (Mirza et al., 2011). As an
example, the petrochemical industry is known for learning from past incidents in order
to avoid recurrence of similar events and improve overall safety measures (Mirza et
al., 2011).
Accident databases are most often developed to provide lesson learned from
existing accidents, as a basis for improving technical systems, operations, management
systems, and organizations (Mirza et al., 2011). Accidents data base maybe useful
sources of ideas for identifying what are going wrong when we are doing a risk
analysis (Mirza et al., 2011). According to Kvaloy and Aven (2005), data from
accident can be used to identify hazards which may give an input to risk analysis.
Many databases with information about accidents and incidents have been established.
Some of these data bases are listed below in Table 2.
Table 2
Hydrogen accident data bases
Database

Number of Web address

Administratered by

Name

incidents

HIRD

194

http://www.h2incidents.
org/

HIAD

253

https://odin.jrc.ec.europa
.eu/hiad/globalview.hiad
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Pacific Northwest
National
Laborattory,USA.
European Commission
Joint Research Center
(JRC),Petten,Netherlan
ds.

ACUsafe

eMARS

FACTS

ERNS

ARIA

ARIP

No
informatio
n available
743

Htpps://www.acusafe.co
m/Incidents/frameincident.htm
http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/typo3/?id=4

US Chemical Safety
board, USA.

Major Accident
Hazards Bureau, JRC
(EG), Italy.
24,100
http://www.factdoline.nl/ TNO Industrial and
External Safety
Departement,
Netherlands.
No
Htpp://www.rtknet.org/d OMB Watch (A noninformatio b/erns/sustance
profit
n available
organisation),USA.
37,000
http://www.aria.develop Frensh Ministry of
pementEcology and
durable.gov.fr/barpi_stat Sustainable
s.gnc
Development,France.
4946
http://www.epa.gov/oem Environmental
/tools.htm#arip
Proctection
Agency,USA.

Note. Adapted from Analysis of hydrogen incidents to support risk assessment, by
Mirza, N. R., Degenkolbe, S., & Witt, W. (2011), International journal of hydrogen
energy, 36(18), 12068-12077,(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2011.06.080).
The information that is gleaned through accident reviews and investigations assists
industries in developing a more effective safety level system, which in turn assures a
more secure and healthy working environment in their respective environments
(Kavloy and Aven, 2005). This method is still beneficial, as it reveals in what direction
the on-going research efforts should be focused, and it does so in an informative
manner. This type of information obtained from the investigation of occurrences can
also be used to bolster some aspects of the risk assessment process (Mirza et al., 2011).
As mentioned previously mentioned, there are a number of databases that store
information about accidents that have occurred in the past. These databases each have
their own set of benefits and drawbacks; for example, some of them are not free to use
or require some kind of subscription, and other databases contain information that is
not reliable (Tauseef et al., 2011). In addition, according to Arun et al (2022), among
accident databases, eMARS–The Major Accident Reporting System gives the most
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comprehensive information possible. This is due to the fact that member states are
required to record all incidents in this accident database. A full report from this
database, however, takes at least two to three years to become available following the
investigation. Given this fact, in this study from 2005 to 2020 Hydrogen accidents in
other industries were examined in eMARS database. This indicates that the most recent
adjustment to the update has been taken into account.

As a part of this study, drawing data from previous accident involving Hydrogen
in various industries, a Hazard Identification (HAZID) analysis is performed to
determine the potential safety threats and their causes and consequences that may
occur on board ships. As a result of the scarcity of data from the maritime sector, the
identification of hazards process can be conducted through the examination of
hydrogen accidents in other industries.
As a result of the scarcity of data from the maritime sector, the HAZID will be
conducted by examining hydrogen accidents in other industries following by the expert
panel judgment to validate the outcomes.

3.2

Data Analysis of Hydrogen incidents from eMARS Database
For the purpose of this study an exploratory Hazard identification study has been

designed on past learning and experiences in various industries. The HAZID study was
structured to identify the potential hazards associated with the use of hydrogen fuel
cells. Following a systematic review of the related literature, Hydrogen accidents in
other industry were examined in Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS)
database. As a result, data of 140 accidents from 2005 to 2020 were collected
accordingly. The data, consisting of accidents report summaries were then sorted for
the analysis in an excel file in five columns: event type, industry type, accident causes,
accident consequences and lessons learned. A table has been attached at the end of the
research as Appendix C. The file was then imported as an internal material to the
qualitative data analysis software, NVivo 12. Subsequently, thematic and statistical
analyses of the data were performed.
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3.3

Thematic analysis (TA)
According to Braun and Clarke (2012), TA is a method for systematically

identifying, organizing, and gaining insight into the factors that are significant across
multiple data sets. The objective of this technique is to determine what is shared by
the most popular topics in the database to be analysed. The TA can be used in a variety
of situations and coding and categorizing of data into themes is one of those
opportunities (Huberman & Miles, 1994).
When analysing data qualitatively, it is crucial to find relationships between
categories and themes of data to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena
involved. Data was previously sorted, clipped, and categorised using coloured pens, a
procedure that took a long time (Hilal & Alabri, 2013). Recent developments in the
field of software tools for qualitative data analysis have greatly simplified and reduced
the difficulty of this once-intensely complex process (Dhakal, 2022). Given this fact,
Nvivo as the qualitative data analysis software is considered the best tool in this
research to manage the coding procedure.

3.4

Barrier Analysis approach for accident prevention
The Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) is an analytical procedure for

determining causes and contributing factors (Johnson, 1975). At the first time MORT
originated from a project undertaken in the 1970s. The purpose of its creation aimed
to provide the U.S. Nuclear industry with a risk management program competent to
achieve high standards of health and safety. Barrier analysis is a component of MORT
analysis, a complex approach to accident investigations. It has been found that every
single accident tends to be complex in terms of many casual factors and preventive
measures. This makes it essential for investigator to have a methodology for breaking
down possible sequence of events and controlling factors leading to an accident.
According to the concept of The MORT model, it illustrates that the causes of any
accidents can be grouped into four main categories (Kingston et al., 2002). Using this
categorisation, can be a relevant step for analysing accident data bases.
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3.5

Delphi methodology
During the following steps of the research methodology of this study, a variety of

sources of information were consulted in order to collect and evaluate the data that
will be the subject of this chapter. In contrast to the majority of experimental studies
conducted in the field of maritime engineering, the method that was applied during
this study was not heavily based in engineering, physics, or mathematics. Instead, it
was heavily based in human behaviour, thought process, and opinion that was
informed by individual experience. Despite its uniqueness, the methodology has been
validated over the course of time and is widely accepted both in academic circles and
in the field of maritime research. The reasons for selecting the method, the steps
involved in the method, as well as the limitation of employing the method, will be
discussed. The last part of this chapter will be a discussion of how the research was
conceived of and carried out within the context of this study.
Every aspect of the risk assessment process contains an element of uncertainty,
which is frequently exacerbated in the case of developing technology (Beaudrie et al.,
2016). In the lack of sufficient empirical evidence, it is possible to estimate unknown
parameters and models based on the subjective expert judgement elicited through
thorough elicitation techniques. One of the most used methods in technology
forecasting is the Delphi method (Helmer et al., 1966).
As with many other technologies and techniques developed in the 20th century,
the Delphi method is a structured research technique used to support a variety of risk
assessment studies in the maritime domain that has applications in other fields (Helmer
et al., 1966). In 2008, Zaloom et al. asked participants from five sectors of the maritime
domain: public ports, United States Coast Guard (USCG), shipping industry, private
ports, and law enforcement to identify events that could disrupt shipping and to rank
their likelihood of occurrence on the Sabine Neches Waterway. The results indicate
that a panel of experts was able to reach a high level of consensus regarding the types
of events posing risks to shipping and the likelihood of their occurrence. Moreover,
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according to Streveler & alstatement (2008) "Proponents of the Delphi method
recognize human judgment as a legitimate and useful input in generating forecasts and
therefore believe that the use of carefully selected experts can produce reliable and
valid results." In other words, it is believed that selecting an appropriate panel of
experts will increase the validity of the findings because, if a diverse panel reaches a
consensus, it will bolster the value of the findings.
Goerlandt et al. (2017) stated that the Delphi method is a suitable method for
detecting maritime risk trends, based on the tools that can detect and assess the
significance of new and emerging risks in the maritime transportation system, such as
the use of a new type of fuel or a new technological system such as an unmanned
vessel. Valdengo et al. (2018) conducted a Delphi survey to identify training and
technology gaps/needs for maritime Special Operations Force (SOF) personnel, which
led to the provision of training and technology to assist SOF personnel in performing
their missions in maritime surveillance more effectively. Moreover, in exploratory,
theory-building research activities involving complex, multidisciplinary issues, the
Delphi method is said to be particularly applicable, particularly when the focus of the
research is the examination of new future trends (Meredith et al., 1989).
In addition to the literature review, the analysis of previous accidents involving
Hydrogen and fuel cells to support the risk assessment of hydrogen fuel cell in ship
has revealed a knowledge gap in the application of hydrogen fuel cells in the maritime
industry. Due to the paucity of research in this field and the complexity of the research
topic, Delphi is seemed to be the ideal research technique for this study. The organised
group communications approach of the Delphi method promotes individual ideas and
progressive group solution creation (Gupta & Clarke, 1996). In addition, the selection
of participants from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds for the Delphi panel
enables the study to adopt a more focused approach in attempting to identify the most
critical risks and safety measures on board an HFC ship, by leveraging the experts'
depth of knowledge in hydrogen use and fuel cell technology and their area of
expertise.
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3.6

Research design

3.6.1

Data collection

Multiple sources of evidence methodology contribute to internal validity,
according to Yin (2003), because it offers data from a variety of sources to assess and
discuss the study topics. As a result, the validity of this research was ensured
throughout the data collection procedure by using multiple sources of evidence.
According to the presented research, the options for the investigation were deemed to
be documents, analysis of incidents database, Delphi interviews and semi structured
interviews. Some kinds of evidence, including observation or survey, were unsuitable
for the study due to the constrained timeline and research site. Even though not all of
the sources were ready, every possible source was thoroughly investigated to ensure
that we had sufficient data to analyse and that we could provide an effective response
to the research topic.
Figure 5
Multiple sources of evidence
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Note. Adapted from Design and methods (3rd ed.), by Yin, R. K. (2003), Case study
research: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, (https://doi.org/10.1037/13620-009).
3.6.2

Interviews

In order to research the study, interviews were conducted with individuals who had
experience or understanding regarding the HFC technology. The purpose of these
interviews was to gather information for the investigation. The style of interview that
we decided to use for this investigation is called a semi-structured interview. The
topics that were going to be discussed and the questions that were going to be asked
were prepared in advance, but they were flexible enough to be adjusted to better fit the
flow of the conversations. The questions were of an open-ended nature, which will
help in gaining a better understanding of the respondents' experiences. The questions
and interview guide will provide a direction for the dialogue during the interview so
that it will focus on the evaluation of risks and the integration of the system. At the
same time, we were able to obtain more supplementary data or topics from
interviewees beyond the scope of our interview questions. According to what Oates
(2005) states about the framework of the semi-interview, extra questions might be
asked whenever the respondents suddenly brought up new issues or fascinating
themes. During the interviewing research phase, a framework for semi-structured
interviews was utilised so that various forms of information that we might obtain could
be captured.
Emails were sent to experts to introduce our research and obtain contact
information for the person we can interview. Many marine organisations and shipping
firms provided encouraging responses when asked if they might contribute their
valuable time to the project. E-mails were addressed to the appropriate parties to
provide more information about the study and the type of data required. Prior to the
actual interviews, they were sent a list of questions to give them time to consider their
responses and to allow them to schedule the interview at their convenience. Online
meetings were appropriate and sufficiently effective for conducting the interview with
them. It is comprised of seven interviews with individuals who have utilised hydrogen

42

and fuel cells in business and shipping. The respondents are from a variety of industries
and positions, which provided a variety of insights on HFCs and risk assessment.
During the interview, the interview was recorded by a recorder and also scripted. Each
interview began with a summary of the research history and field of inquiry.
After conducting interviews, the experience of the interviewees regarding the
application of HFC in the maritime industry was recorded. Capturing and further
investigating or analysing the most significant risks and associated repercussions to
better help the risk assessment process.
3.6.3

Application of the Delphi method on the data collection

The purpose of the Delphi study is to elicit from Delphi experts a convergent list
of significant risks and hazards associated with HFC-powered ships in order to
facilitate risk analysis and decision-making. The ultimate research conclusion is
qualitative, but the responses must be quantitative so they can be statistically analysed
for the Delphi technique to be successful. To accomplish this, the interview questions
required the experts to assess the importance of the output's relevance. The data
gathering consists of two major steps: the selection of experts and the rounds of the
Delphi questionnaire.
3.6.4

Expert selection

The selection of qualified experts is the primary determinant of the quality of any
Delphi study. According to the procedure outlined in Okoli (2004), the experts will be
chosen accordingly.
1.

Prepare a Knowledge Resource Nomination Worksheet (KRNW).
The KRNW intends to categorise the experts so that no significant categories

of experts are neglected. As this research focuses on HFC technology in the
maritime industry, the specialist categories include chief engineers, Masters, BV
inspectors, and personnel in charge of the machinery and safety of Plan Approval
surveyors.
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2.

Populate the KRNW with Names. Under the various categories, possible

experts were selected. The experts comprised of six maritime professionals. Two
experts will be invited per category for the interview process, for a total of six
experts. This guarantees that each category is well represented while keeping the
number of participants manageable. The Delphi method does not require a big
number of participants because it is a targeted research technique designed to
achieve a decent consensus of viewpoints among a group of professionals.
3.

Invite Experts.

The experts were reached by email, phone, and online

meeting. In addition, the initial strategy included briefing the experts on the
research study and the Delphi procedure.

3.6.5

Delphi interview questions rounds

The Delphi study was conducted in three iterations, as described below: (most
hazardous spaces based on the literature review).
Round 1.

Brainstorming of hazard identification. In this stage, the experts

were tasked with identifying and ranking the most pertinent places for the
concept installation based on the ship system and interview questions. In
addition, they were asked to identify any other locations on board ships that
they consider to be hazardous. At this stage, the experts were not briefed on
the results of the literature research or the data obtained from lessons learned
past hydrogen events. The first questionnaires were created with an
introduction that provides a brief summary of the research topic, the Delphi
method, and the participation requirements. The goal of the preamble was to
provide sufficient information to the experts to prevent uncertainty on the
research topic and to provide the experts the best opportunity to provide highquality responses for the subsequent questionnaire round.
Round 2.

After analysing the outcomes of the first round, the second

questionnaire conveyed the findings of the first round to the experts. The
experts were also tasked with identifying all potential dangers and their
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underlying causes; for each prospective hazard, the probability of its
occurrence and potential repercussions were debated and ranked. Any newly
detected possible dangers in the first round were relayed to the expert panel
and incorporated into the ranking.
Round 3.

Identification of the severity of the consequences. The second

round's results were relayed to the experts. When an expert's round 2 ranking
was significantly different from the group mean ranking, the experts were
asked to explain why. Accordingly, the experts were asked to discuss the
severity of the prospective implications.

3.6.6

Expert judgment
According to Stoneburner (2002) the likelihood and severity of a result are both

important considerations for determining a risk level. After a list of potential hazards
and their repercussions has been compiled, it's time to determine the likelihood of an
incident and the extent of any damage that could result.
In this study, the evaluation of risks will be done by expert judgment because
in this method it is easy to use providing there are clear guidelines on how to evaluate
the level of risk. Other methods are more complex and require more detailed
calculations. In order to prevent accidents and other unwanted events possibly
occurring when dealing with installations such as HFC on board ships this requires
evaluation of identified risks.
 Selection of Probability Occurrence Method
Safe practices in the use of hydrogen and fuel cells are essential for the
widespread acceptance throughout the maritime industry. In this scenario, to
identify and explore potential undesired events a risk assessment is necessary.
However, in many cases, this approach is not possible due to unavailable or
non-representative data. Many researches have done previously that relied on
expert opinion to assess the probability of occurrence of undesired events
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particularly when data are unavailable or if it is about a new technology or
no accidents have been occurred yet . As stated by Martins et al. (2020), the
probability evaluation of events based on historical data may not be accurate
and should be elicited from experts. Expert elicitation is deployed when data
are absent or uninformative and critical decisions must be made (Martins et
al., 2020).
It's worth noting that since the introduction of HFC as a power to propel ships, the
marine industry has experienced zero accidents. Thus, a subjective evaluation is a
possibility since it permits working independently of the previous data, resulting in
more trustworthy outcomes.
 Severity of consequence based on expert elicitation
For each identified causes and following hazards, an estimation of potential
consequence shall be made; the severity of consequence can be measured as
indicated in Table 4. In this context the risk analysis expert can estimate the
potential consequences by using their judgement.
All identified hazards are ranked based on their frequency and severity, and then
the researcher chooses several main hazards with high risk to analyse in detail. Based
on IMO formal safety assessment (2013), the scale used to estimate the probability
occurrence of the event as well as the severity consequence scale are presented in the
Table 3 and Table 4 as follow:
Table 3
Scale for estimation probability of occurrence

Frequency of
the event

1

2

3

4

Extremely
remote

Remote

Reasonably
probable

frequent
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Table 4
Scale used to estimate the severity of consequence

Severity of

1

2

3

4

Minor

significant

severe

Catastrophic

consequence
3.6.7

Degree of agreement between experts’ concordance

In the HAZID process, experts are asked to assign a risk ranking to various events
or incidents based on their assessment of their severity and likelihood. Since this is a
subjective ranking, it is possible that different experts will come up with different lists
of worst-case scenarios. To improve the transparency in the outcome, the final ranking
should also include a concordance coefficient showing how well the experts agreed
among themselves. In each round, the statistical data (rankings) will be analysed in
order to calculate the mean rank and sample standard deviation. The convergence of
opinions was qualitatively assessed using Kendall's coefficient of convergence W in
accordance with Okoli's Delphi approach (2004). W ranges from 0 to 1, denoting a
lack of consensus to absolute agreement, respectively. Schmidt (1997) suggested that
a moderate consensus exists for W = 0.5 and a strong consensus exists for W > 0.7. To
conclude the Delphi rounds for the purposes of this study, “W” must exceed 0.70.

3.7

Reliability and validity
The exploratory method used in this research provided deep insights and

information regarding the aim and the objectives of the research. According to the
present study, the past accidents analysis reported by incident database have been
performed from 2005 to 2020. In this database, the majority of accidents that occurred
in EU member states are listed as well as detailed reports.
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The interview questions conducted through the Delphi Rounds were prepared
carefully concerning both content and structure and were validated by a professor with
extensive experience and knowledge in the maritime sector. The reliance upon expert
judgement is recognised as prime input to decision analysis which is a major decision
aiding technique (Martins et al., 2020). The reliability and validity evaluation of the
Delphi questionnaire was performed in the data analysis. Also, by involving relevant
experts for this research such as classification society inspectors, chief engineers,
Masters, and Plan Approval surveyors' machinery and safety, a valid and reliable
research outcome can be achieved.

3.8

Ethical Consideration
Throughout the research process, ethical considerations were taken into account as

an essential factor in order to prevent any ethical issues from arising. The WMU
Research Ethics Committee conducted a comprehensive review to ensure that the
highest ethical standards were adhered to before approving the interview. In addition
to respecting the participants' rights and privacy, the study addressed confidentiality,
anonymity, data protection, and withdrawal options. Importantly, the individuals'
participation was entirely voluntary and they were not compensated for their
involvement. After the dissertation was submitted, no changes or additions were made
to the received data, and all materials were removed. The protocol of the WMU
Research Ethics Committee is included in Appendix A: WMU Research Ethics
Committee Protocol.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS
A theoretical basis for the study as well as recommendations for conducting the
research was presented in previous chapters. The following section provides an
overview of what are the lessons learned from analysing the data. In this context,
analysis of qualitative data based on accident database is presented first and then
proceeds on to consideration of the expert judgment data analysis.

4.1

Thematic analysis
Thematic analysis was performed to identify categories and themes, which would

capture the causes and consequences of the examined accidents.

4.2

Management Oversight and Risk Tree
Using the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) method, the detected

direct causes of hydrogen-related incidents were classified into four main groups
(Kingston et al., 2002) and based on the accident analysis, further segmented into 17
categories (see Table 5). Human factors include errors and violations that contributed
either directly or indirectly to accident occurrence. Management factors relate to the
organization, that contributed to accident occurrence. Technical factors relate to
equipment failure. External factors are associated with the external environment.
Table 5
Classification of accidents causes

Contributing

Themes

Factors
HE1. Maintenance leading to damage
HE2. Operations induced damage
Human Error HE3. Changing in operating procedures
HE4. Inadequate communication
HE5. Lack of supervision/inadequate inspection
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HE6. Inadequate preventive maintenance
EF1. Mechanical component failure (pump, valve, relieve valve
and piping)
Equipment
EF.2Absence of preventive measures (relief valve, sensor…)
failure
EF3. Design flaw/material incompatibility
EF4. Installation power loss
EF5. Inadequate system monitoring/oversight
Management MF1. Inadequate preventive maintenance
factors
MF2. Training issues
MF3. Failure in procedures
OF1. Operating environment (weather, vibration….)
Other factors OF2. External hazards (external fire, sabotage…etc.)
Regarding the accident consequences, five themes were identified: workers’
exposure to hydrogen; fire; explosion; fire and explosion; property damage.

4.3

Statistical analysis
After extracting and classifying the themes, the accident data (causes and

consequences) were coded using NVivo. Figure 5 summarizes the statistical analysis
of the causes of the accidents. Then, the frequency distribution of accident
consequences is presented at Figure 6. In addition, as part of Figure 7, hazards analysis
regarding the use of hydrogen in various industries are also displayed.
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Figure 6
Frequency distribution of the causal factors of hydrogen accidents in the industry
(N=158)

Figure 7
Frequency distribution of consequences of hydrogen accidents in the industry
(N=103)
Workers exposure to
hydrogen (injury/death)

9%

Fire

26%

Explosion

33%
11%

Fire + Explosion
21%
Property damage
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Figure 8
Hazards associated with the use of Hydrogen in the industry (data analysis of 140
accidents on eMARS database)
Leakage

Source of ignition

Natural leaks

14%

25%

4.4

61%

Data analysis through Delphi study
Initial invitations and Participant Consent Forms were emailed to prospective

Delphi participants. In accordance with the requirements of the WMU Research Ethics
Committee, the Delphi study did not begin until all participants had submitted signed
consent forms. Six of the ten invited participants consented to participate in this study.
4.4.1

Delphi round 1

Round 1 Delphi commenced in August 2022 with a sample set of six participants.
All six participants returned their questionnaires on time. The samples set consist of
senior professionals in the maritime industry, which includes BV inspectors, Plan
Approval surveyor machinery and safety, Masters, Chief engineers.
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Figure 9
Occupation of Delphi participants

Number of Delphi participants
Number of Delphi participants

1

1

BV inspector

Plan approval surveyor
machinary and safety

2

2

Master

Chief engineer

All participants are based in Algeria and France. The participants’ ages vary from
51 to 60, indicating the extensive experience they have in the industry. Despite the
relatively small sample size, the Delphi panel is a fair representation of the Hydrogen
fuel cell technology. In order to safeguard the anonymity of the Delphi participants,
subsequent conversations on the Delphi study will be conducted anonymously.
All participants have had involvement with Risk assessment, ship fire and safety
in their careers. 90% of participants have had more than 15 years involvement with
shipping activities. The majority of participants have an important level of
understanding with regards to the use of the hydrogen fuel cell technology.
The first Delphi round asked the participants to analyse the basic installation of
ship to determine any spaces that they judge them to be the most risky or dangerous
spaces. The first-round questionnaire is shown in Appendix D, and then the feedback
results of the expert panel are shown in the Table 6.
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Table 6
Feedback results of the expert questionnaire (round one)

DS1.Hydrogen
tank space
DS2.Fuel cell
space
DS3.Engine
space
DS4.Battery
space
DS5.Bunkering
station
DS6.Fuel
transfer space

P1/
RANK
1

P2/
RANK
1

P3/
RANK
1

P4/
RANK
1

P5/
RANK
2

P6/
RANK
1

2

2

2

1

2

2

6

6

6

5

5

5

4

4

3

2

1

3

3

3

4

1

2

4

5

5

5

6

6

6

The panel expert has identified six spaces that they judge them to be risky spaces
on board HFC ships. These identified spaces are: fuel transfer space, bunkering station,
fuel cell space, machinery space, battery space and hydrogen storage space. A number
of potential hazards have been discussed, and the two most pertinent ship installation
spaces, respectively "Hydrogen storage space" and "Fuel Cell space", have been
emphasized.
4.4.2

Delphi round 2

In Round 2, Delphi participants were only presented with the two spaces they
believe are most likely to be affected by the risks. Based on this, after identifying risk
factors and their causes, the participants were requested to rank their probability of
occurrence (PO) and the severity of consequences (SOC). The experts questionnaire
is shown in Appendix E. Then the feedback is presented below.

54

Table 7
Feedback results of the expert questionnaire (round two)
Hazardous

Cause

event

-Pipelines and connections (mainly the connections of
the H2 pipe to the FC);
Human error (e.g. from maintenance and operation);
Corrosion of hydrogen pipes (fatigue corrosion,
corrosion thinning, mechanical stress;
-Manufacturing errors of fuel cell/ connectors;
-Material compatibility with hydrogen (embrittlement);
-FC not in conformity for a maritime environment
(corrosion, vibration).
- Tank overfilling.
- Tank materials defect.
- Valve leakage.
- Defect in piping.
- Relief valve failure.
- Control system failure.
Presence
-Electrical ignition source: cable going through the
of ignition spaces, lights, ventilation, fans control valves,
source in
detection system, power tools, and equipment during
space
service/maintenance, fc and its associated electrical
equipment.
-Collision/mechanical damage.
-Mechanically caused spark: failure of mechanical
ventilation systems fan.
-Static discharge.
-Heat: heat spread from a fire in adjacent space,
friction of machinery or power tools, hot surfaces
(overheating, electricity, piping).
Permeation No particular cause it does happen naturally
Leakage

Flooding

-Collision.
-External damage.
-Hatches that have lost their water tightness.
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Probability
of event (14),including
all possible
causes
4

3

1
2

The PO (frequency) of the hazards and the SOC of the hazards rankings in round
two are shown in the table below. For the purpose of statistical computation, let i be
the PO, 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 be the rank given to PO i by participant number j. Let m be the number of
participants and n be the total number of PO’s.
Table 8
PO of the hazard Rankings 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 in Delphi round 2 (m=6)
Judge j

Hazards i
1

2

3

4

5

6

4

2

2

2

3

2

4

4

4

4

3

4

Source of Ignition

3

4

3

3

4

3

Flooding

3

2

4

4

2

3

Permeation

Leakage

Kendall's coefficient of concordance W is used to measure the convergence of ranks.
12 𝑆

W = 𝑚2 (𝑛3 −𝑛)
Where m and n are defined above and S is the sum of squared deviations, defined as
follows.
S=∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅̅ )2
Ri is the total rank given to PO of the hazard i, and R is the mean of these total ranks.
̅ 1
𝑅𝑖 = ∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ; 𝑅 = 2 m(n+1)
The calculations for “W” is shown on Table 9.
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Table 9
Calculation the Kendall’s coefficient of concordance W (round 2)
Hazard i
1
2
3
4
Total S

̅ )2
( 𝑹𝒊 − 𝑹
0
64
25
9
162

Ri
15
23
20
18

12×162

𝑊 = 62 (43 −4) = 0, 9
With regard to the calculations made in this round 2, a strong consensus has been
achieved with w =0, 9. The experts generally agreed that leakage is a hazard that is
frequent to occur, having a mean rank of 3, 83. Presence of source of ignition hazard
(3) came second with a mean rank of 3, 33 followed by flooding hazard. According to
the mean rank in round 2, the PO hazards group rankings are summarised in the table
below.
Table 10
Group Ranking of PO in round 2
Number
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
4.4.3

Probability occurrence of Rank
hazard
Permeation
1
Leakage
4
Source of ignition
3
flooding
2

Delphi Round 3

The round 3 questionnaire began with a review of Round two results. Following
the recommendations of Schmidt (1997), three pieces of information were fed back to
the participants. First, the group mean for probability occurrence for each hazard was
given and compared with the participants’ Round 2 rankings. As such the
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questionnaires were individually tailored to suit each participant’s rankings. Second,
the degree of convergence of Round 2 opinions was reported as being very strong.
Third, for each identified hazard, the percentage of participants who ranked them in
the top half was reported. The second and third pieces of information gave the
participants a sense of the level of consensus achieved. After that, the participants were
asked only about the top hazard which is hydrogen leakage. After that, the expert
panel participants were brainstormed and discussed the resulting scenarios from
hydrogen fuel leakage in ships. The resulting consequence that was constructed
included: crew exposure to hydrogen, fire, jet flame, and explosion. Similar to the
round 2, the severity of consequence is shown in Table 11 below:
Table 11
Severity of consequence Rankings ri,j in Delphi round 3 (m=6)
Consequences

Judge j
1

2

3

4

5

6

1

1

2

2

1

2

3

4

3

4

4

4

Jet flame

2

1

1

3

3

3

Explosion

4

4

3

3

3

3

Crew exposure to hydrogen
Fire

Table 12
Calculation the Kendall’s coefficient of concordance W (Round 3)
Consequence i
Crew exposure to
hydrogen
Explosion
Jet flame

Ri
9

̅ )2
( 𝑹𝒊 − 𝑹
36

20
13

25
4
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Fire
Total S

𝑤=

22

49
114

12 × 114
= 0,63
62 (43 − 4)

As shown in the table above, a moderate to a strong convergence has been achieved
with W = 0, 63. The experts generally agreed that fire is the high consequence that
likely to occur when HFC is installed on board ship, which has a mean rank of 3, 66.
In second position, the explosion with mean rank of 3, 33. Table 12 provides a
summary of the consequence group rankings according to the third round's mean
ranks.
Table 13
Consequence group rankings according to the third round's mean ranks
Number
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

4.5

Consequences
Crew exposure to
hydrogen
Explosion
Jet flame
Fire

Rank
1
3
2
4

Barrier Analysis
After consulting with two professionals from the World Maritime University

(WMU), the researcher compiled a list of potential safety solutions to mitigate the risks
posed by hydrogen leakage, which were subsequently validated by the professionals
consulted. (see Appendix B: Personal interview).
The proposed safety measures are listed below:


Suitable gas detection systems for fire extinguishing and fire detection should
be in compliance with maritime environment.
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Ventilation system should be designed to manage the expected natural leaks
of hydrogen.



Protective equipment to reduce the risk of asphyxia to the crew.



New training for seafarers.



The use of adequate material in accordance with maritime conditions.



A regular check of the automatic devices response time.



Open air system is proposed to ensure an optimal dispersion and a reduced
pressure in the spaces.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND LIMITATION
This chapter provides a discussion of the findings and its limitation points.

5.1

Discussion of the findings
As previously mentioned, the study included forth research questions.

Research question one (Q1): What are the risks associated with the future operation of
Hydrogen Fuel-cell powered ships.
To answer this question Q1, data analysis from land based accidents data were
conducted. Content analysis of the Hydrogen accidents database yielded a
classification of the contributing factors associated with the use of HFC on various
industries in four main categories: human error, equipment failure, management
factors and other factors (see chapter 4.2).
Supported by statistical analysis and based on the details of accidents analysis
themes, causes and consequences were coded by using Nvivo tool. The themes
represented “the nodes”, and each accident meant one “case”. The total occurrence
frequency of the direct causes was 158. Equipment failure (48, 73%) and human error
(30, 38%) had the highest frequencies. For the human errors, human errors during
maintenance (HE1) and operations (HE2) had a total frequency of 19%, while
changing in operation procedures (HE3) and inadequate communication had 21%.
Management factors represents 20%, in which inadequate preventive maintenance
planning (MF1) represents 8%. In parallel, the total frequency of accidents
consequences was 103. The analysis of this carefully 140 accidents hydrogen based
incidents showed that 33, 01% of them resulted in fires, 21, 36% in explosion and
10,68% in both fire and explosion. Worker’s exposure represented 8, 74% of the total
and the reminder percentage were attributed to the property damage.
Subsequently, to qualitatively answer the research question Q2 which is “What is
the perception of maritime professionals regarding the risks that might be linked to the
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use of HFC on board ships”, Delphi interviews were conducted. The result shows that
all the risks associated with the use of HFC in other industries were highly correlated
with those that may occur on board ships. With regards to the hazardous events, the
group rankings correlate well with the findings of data analysis of hydrogen incidents
database in figure 6, for instance the top ranking is leakage has been consistently
identified previously in the accident database analysis. Likewise, the source of ignition
hazard, which was ranked three by the group, has been identified in 25% of the
eMARS Database. However, flooding hazard that can be originated from external
damage to the ship (rank 2) was not presented in the eMARS accidents database. This
could be explained by the fact that most of the accidents have been occurred basically
on other type of industries then in shipping. In practice, flooding hazard should be
taken into consideration, as the Delphi participants observed in their experience.
For the leakage hazard, the group rankings correlate well with the eMARS
database findings. For instance, the top-ranking fire consequence has been consistently
identified in the eMARS database with percentage of 33 % of all analysed accidents.
Likewise, the explosion which has ranked 3 by the group has been identified in 21%
of the accidents that have happened involving hydrogen use. However, Jet of flame
(ranked 2) which present only uncountable accidents cases in the database. In addition
to crew exposure to hydrogen leading to injuries and fatalities has presented only
minor severity and that according to the expert due to the fact that seafarers are
expected to be aware of safety issues when this technology is finally deployed. In this
regard, the correlation analysis results led to state, as an answer to the research question
(Q1) and (Q2).
Research question (Q3): What are the lessons learned from accidents database
of Hydrogen fuel cell technology in other industries to assess the risks of fuel-cell
powered ships?
The research question Q3 refers to lesson learned from accidents in other industries
that have occurred in the past. This question was investigated through a comparison
analysis of the findings of the accidents database and the Delphi rounds. The Delphi
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rankings are compared with the eMARS Database precisely regarding Hydrogen use
in various industries. Note that the rankings from the database encompass various
industries outside the scope of this study, which is limited to HFC in maritime
shipping. There is generally good agreement between the findings of the Delphi and
the eMARS Database. Other hazardous events were discussed by the Delphi
participants, which is the probability occurrence of the flooding event. This hazard
was not mentioned in the data analysis from accidents database. One explanation is
that participants have an important experience in the maritime industry. On this basis,
the consequence due to the flooding would probably not be severe in comparison to
the remaining hazard.
Research question Q4: What are the safety measures that can be implemented
to navigate safely on board HFC vessels?
Finally, the main element concerning the safety measures in case of hydrogen
leakage is that the leak must be immediately halted to prevent its escalation. To avoid
and reduce the effects of hydrogen leaks, suitable gas detection systems for fire
extinguishing and detection are expected safety precautions in both fuel storage areas
and fuel cell areas. This is a mitigation barrier against hydrogen leakage. Particularly
crucial will be the installation of hydrogen-detecting sensors in any hydrogen space to
aid in the detection of any unseen leaks. Furthermore, a ventilation system or an
inerting system needs to exist in these spaces. For hydrogen-fueled ships, specific
barriers need to be designed and adapted to tackle safety issues as well.
Additionally, some barriers such as protective equipment, regulations, practices,
and procedures are in place to minimise the risk of crew exposure to hydrogen as a
cargo. For example, the IGF Code introduces new training requirements for seafarers
in order to protect them from ships using gases or other low flashpoints. In particular,
Chapter 14 of the IGC Code stipulates regulations for respiratory and eye protection,
breathing apparatus, emergency escape, contaminated showers, eyewash, and
protective apparel. However, hydrogen as a fuel on board will require further rigorous
provisions. For example, to avoid corrosion in hydrogen pipes, the use of adequate
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materials is required. In addition, to maintain continuous monitoring, the strength of
various pipes should be monitored regularly. Therefore, further prescriptive design is
required to be adopted considering, human exposure limits and, more importantly, the
response time of automatic action devices (detectors, shut-off valves, and sniffers to
be used during maintenance).
Furthermore, in general, the strategies used for hydrogen applications are based on
an event system in order to ensure quick dispersion and a lesser probability of pressure
build-up. In this regard, open air in the space storage and fuel cell room might be the
most feasible solution to avoid fire and explosion risks. In accordance with the interim
IMO Guidelines and the IGF Code, access to hydrogen storage spaces and fuel cell
spaces should preferably be directly from the open deck or through airlocks. So, if
hydrogen leaks, the people in charge would be safe from problems related to
suffocating effect.

5.2

Limitation
In this research study, limitations exist. First, the hazard identification analysis was

based on previous accidents involving hydrogen in other industries. These accidents
could have different causes and consequences in the maritime context, given the
shipboard environment. In further research, other techniques of HAZID could be used,
such as risk workshops, personal interviews, and focus group exercises involving
different maritime professionals. Another limitation is the limited number of maritime
experts used in the Delphi method, six experts. This was due to time limitations. Due
to travel restrictions to Covid-19, the online option was used in the interview with
experts. Physical interaction with an expert can depict more information, which could
bring more benefits to the study. Lastly, the probability calculation was mainly based
on expert judgment. In future research, other quantitative methods, such as Fuzzy
Logic and Bayesian Network tools, could be used to assist the calculation.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1

Conclusions

Through this study, the researcher has discovered and analysed a number of
hazards and their probability occurrence as well as their severity of consequence and
safety measures relating to the use of hydrogen fuel cells in maritime application. A
number of follow up recommendations are discussed in the following subsection, to
improve and make more effective the implementation of this technology safely in the
maritime sector.
In accordance with IGF code, an approval process for adaption of alternative fuels
and power systems is required to play a crucial role in the journey towards
sustainability. It is important to note, in this regard, that these new power systems must
provide a comparable level of safety to conventional solutions. Nevertheless, the main
dangers associated with using HFC on board ships linked to the risks of fire and
explosion. Further, there is a probability that the crews may be exposed to asphyxia
environment, or that they may suffer from suffocating effect. As of yet, neither the
IMO, Flag States, nor Class Societies have presented any satisfactory rules or
requirements for hydrogen fuel cell-powered ships. Having said that, this is still a work
in progress.
In addition, The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has started the process
of adding fuel cell regulations to the IGF Code. In terms of safety, risk assessment can
be used as a means of providing decision makers with information needed to
understand factors that can harmfully impact any kind of operations. Since there is a
lack of data from the maritime industry particularly when a new technology is about
to be implemented, analysing accidents from various industries could support risk
assessment process in this field. Further, lesson learnt gathered in relation to the
involvement of HFC from previous experience could serve as an advance step to make
this technology safer and more sustainable.
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While reviewing the lesson learnt from accident database of hydrogen, the
researcher found out that applying hazard analysis at early stage will guide the design
and the operation of safe HFC ships.
This work interrogated and then discussed the different perspectives to analyse
hazards emanating from HFC technology as well as the feasibility of using risk
analysis as an aid to decision making in the maritime transportation sector. HFC in the
maritime industry is not very different from other industries. Although, the maritime
industry is a high-risk industry, it is reasonable to conduct a risk analysis through the
analysis of accidents that have been happened from different industries.
A qualitative risk approach was used in this research based on hydrogen incident
database which was validated by expert elicitation via Delphi method. The analysis of
the interviews questionnaire and incident findings helped the researcher understand
the various risks associated with the future operation of hydrogen fuel cell powered
ships. Through this research, the researcher was also able to find how can we use
accident data of HFC technology from other industries to analyse risks of HFC
powered ships and how the experts through their experience and their knowledge in
the maritime field could give their expectations regarding the potential hazards
associated with hydrogen storage space as well as fuel cell area on board vessels in
addition to proposed safety measures that could minimize the risks.
In response to the questions posed by the research, the findings of the research and
the analysis of those findings indicate the following:


A number of potential ignition factors, including electrical sources, mechanical
damage, mechanically caused sparks, static discharge, sources of heat, and the
auto-ignition of a hydrogen leak, have been identified as being present in the
area that houses the fuel cells and the hydrogen storage space. In the meantime,
a great number of preventative safety measures have been devised in order to
get rid of or lessen the amount of sources of ignition in areas that contain
hydrogen, thereby lowering the risk of fires and explosions. These preventative
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safety measures include the selection of materials, the utilisation of classified
equipment, and maintenance routines for the crew.


Similarly, it was discovered that leakage presented a risk in both the
compartments used for fuel storage and fuel cells. Leakage was found to be a
common and even probable threat in a gasoline storage area, and it was
concluded that if testing and maintenance of the tanks were not managed
effectively, the area would be at risk. Corrosion of system components,
connection problems, and manufacturing faults are some of the possible causes
that have been indicated. An explosion is the worst-case scenario that could
emerge from a breach; it could cause significant damage to the ship or perhaps
result in fatalities. The potential repercussions of a leakage can vary. Safety
precautions such as A-60 divisions, gas detection, and adequate systems for
fire-extinguishing and fire detection are expected to be present in fuel storage
areas and fuel cell spaces, respectively, in order to avoid and reduce the effects
of the release of hydrogen. As an additional precautionary measure, it will be
necessary to install either a ventilation system or an inerting system in the areas
in question.



Inherent in the tiny size of hydrogen molecules is the risk of permeation.
Hydrogen storage tank materials should be evaluated to determine their
permeation rates to guarantee safe levels of hydrogen storage. The
performance of metal lining is anticipated to be superior to that of polymer
lining in this respect. It is important that the ventilation system in the
hydrogen storage area be built to control the expected permeation. Using
double-walled pipes and butt-welded connections could help reduce leaks in
the piping system. Some additional precautions against and amelioration of
permeation were also identified.



Flooding hazard was also identified by Delphi rounds in hydrogen tank spaces
and fuel cell spaces; however, this hazard was not emphasized in hydrogen
incident database.
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Any hardware utilised in such an arrangement must be suitable for use at sea.
There were also concerns brought up about vibrations and sea water exposure.
To prove their worth in a marine setting, components must undergo rigorous
testing and certification.

The next sub-section gives recommendations which MSEAs future researchers can
follow to conduct hazard analysis to explore the impact of hydrogen and fuel cells on
the maritime industry.

6.2

Recommendations

To make the use of HFC safer on-board ships, prepare the crew, and ensure the
safety of life at sea, a risk assessment is required. By analyzing the risks inherited from
HFC-fuelled ships, and by providing risk information to shipping personnel, we can
gain a deeper understanding of this new technology. In the process of risk assessment,
a list of areas where further studies and work are recommended is presented below:


Additional evaluation of the identified risks, particularly the risk of explosion
associated with hydrogen leakage.



A thorough evaluation of the cost of the identified safety measure and its effect
on the identified risks.



In order to understand more clearly the causes and consequences of hydrogen
leakage scenario, the application of bow tie model would be more effective to
develop prevention and mitigation measures.



Further investigation into the bunkering of hydrogen and its associated safety
precautions.



Analyse the development of hydrogen installation costs in light of the progress
of both technology and legislation.



Collect incident information in hydrogen industry from various incidents
databases.



Create a checklist for preventing maritime incidents from occurring based on
the effects, causes, and consequences in different industries.
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More research into past failures is required, together with the application of the
lessons learned, in order to better improve risk assessment in the future.



Based on the findings of this study, a quantitative risk assessment could be
developed.
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Appendix B: Personal Interview

Interview Consent Form
Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research Interview, which is
carried out in connection with a Dissertation which will be written by the interviewer,
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in
Maritime at the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden.
The topic of the Dissertation: HAZARD ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN FUEL
CELL SHIPS USING LAND BASED ACCIDENTS DATA AND ELICITATION OF
EXPERTS
The information provided by you in this interview will be used for research purposes
and the results will form part of a dissertation, which will later be published online in
WMU's digital repository (maritime commons) subject to final approval of the
University and made available to the public. Your personal information will not be
published. You may withdraw from the research at any time, and your personal data
will be immediately deleted.
Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a World
Maritime University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the degree
is awarded. Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.
Student’s name: Chahrazed Tigha
Specialization: Maritime Safety and Environment Administration (MSEA)
Email address: w1011299@wmu.se
***
I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand
that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest
confidence, and will be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.
Name:……………………………………………………………………..
Signature:…………………………………………………………………
Date:………………………………………………………………………
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Interview questions
Company or organization:
Position:
Experience (by year):

1. Several hazards have been identified through literature reviews, such as
leakages, ignition, asphyxia, corrosion, fires, explosions, and
flammability...etc. Could you please elaborate on the safety hazards
associated with hydrogen fuel cell in ship based on your experience?
2. a. Could you cite some factors leading to accidents on board ship with
regard to HFC use?
2. b. What hazards associated with this technology have the potential to
result in the worst consequences on board ships?
3. Could you cite which are the most dangerous areas related to the use of
HFC on board vessel? And why?
4. Could you cite which are the most significant risks (the consequence of
the hazard) when dealing with HFC?
5. In general, the HFC system on ships consists of 6 spaces, namely
bunkering station, fuel transfer space, hydrogen storage space, fuel cell
space, machinery space and battery space. Which from those spaces are
the most hazardous spaces on board ships? Could you elaborate more
on the types of hazards that may be found in these risky areas?
6. Could you please elaborate on their origin (pipeline, leakages, static
electricity…)?
7. Could you please comment on the contribution of human error in the
occurrence of fire and explosion accidents on board HFC vessels? Could
you please give an example of accident you have faced during your
career where human error was the main contributing factor?
8. Could you please comment on the adequacy of the current training of
the crew in order to operate safely hydrogen fuel cell ships?
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9. Could you please comment on the level of safety awareness / safety
culture of ship’s crew to mitigate the emerging risks coming with this
new technology (HFC)?

10. Could you please define the needed safety barriers (as classified below)
to mitigate the hazards associated with the use of HFC on board
merchant ships? Could please elaborate on their effectiveness?






people barrier
Management barrier
material barriers
work and task barrier
environment barriers

Any Comments:

11. If operator error of HFC acts as barrier, which root cause can be?
12. If management aspect acts as barrier, which root cause can be?
13. If technical aspect acts as barrier, which root cause can be?
14. If inadequate maintenance aspect acts as barrier, which root cause can
be?
15. While this alternative fuel (HFC) comes with its own risks and
challenges, how does your organisation at managerial level attempt to
mitigate and find solution toward safe use of HFC?
16. When talking about accidents that have been occurred in the industry
related to the use of hydrogen fuel cell (HFC), to what extent the
lessons learned could help maritime industry to mitigate risks
associated with HFC?
End of questions
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Appendix C: Screenshot of excel eMARS Database
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Appendix D: Expert questionnaire (Round one)
Please list at list which is the most dangerous spaces (DS) related to the use of HFC
on board ship. Or in other words, what are the most critical areas that must be under
more attention to avoid any significant risks from happening?
DS 1……………………………………………………………………………….
DS 2……………………………………………………………………………….
DS 3……………………………………………………………………………….
DS 4……………………………………………………………………………….
DS 5……………………………………………………………………………….
DS 6……………………………………………………………………………….
Others……………………………………………………………………………….
Please rank the above DS’s in the order of decreasing importance (1- most dangerous,
6- least essential).

Dangerous spaces(DS) on board HFC
ships
DS 1
DS 2
DS 3
DS 4
DS 5
DS 6
Others
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Rank (1-6)
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Appendix E. Expert questionnaire (Round two)
Hazardous event Questionnaire for HFC ships
Please fill in the Hazardous event that may occur on HFC ships and the reasons for
them based on your own work experience. Rank them from 1 to 4 (1.Extremely
Remote, 2.Remote, 3.reasonably probable, 4.Frequent)
Causes

Hazardous events

Probability of
event

(1-

4),including all
possible
causes
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